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Exhibition of Person in Personal
Injury Cases
Dennis M. Burgoon*

A

RECENT PERSONAL

INJURY

CASE

involving two seriously in-

jured plaintiffs has shed new light upon a seemingly well
established rule concerning the exhibition of the plaintiff's person to the jury in a personal injury case. In the cases of Beal v.
Southern Union Gas Co. and Rix v. Southern Union Gas Co.,'
the court, in hearing the two cases together, permitted one of the
plaintiffs, who was disfigured to such an extent as to be considered gruesome, to remove the covering about his head in the
presence of the jury. The record disclosed that the plaintiffs had
been working in a pit dug in the street, correcting some difficulty
in the exterior of a gas junction box. Gas had leaked into the
junction box, and a spark from the work caused it to explode,
hideously and permanently destroying Rix's ears, nose, arms, and
eyes, and causing total disfigurement.
While the trial court refused to permit the prospective jurors
to view the plaintiff upon the voir dire, the court did permit the
plaintiff to remove the covering from his head during the trial
for the purpose of allowing the jury to view the extent of the
injury. While it might appear that such an exhibition to the jury
would go beyond the usually accepted bounds of decency, and
should have therefore been excluded, or that such exhibition
should have been excluded on the ground that it would unduly
prejudice the jury, the trial court and the appeals court refused
to exclude such exhibition.
The exhibition of the person before a jury is not at all a
recent concept in the law. At the common law, the writ of
2
de ventra inspeciendo (inspection of the body) was recognized.
The exhibition of the plaintiff's person to the jury is, of
course, recognized to the extent that it is evidence of a relevant
fact in issue. The allowance of the exhibition of personal injuries,
as a part of the real or demonstrative evidence, is one method by
which a court may properly acquire knowledge on which to base
*
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8 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2220 (3rd ed. 1940).

66 N. M. 424, 349 P. 2d 337 (1960).
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its decision,3 and "where the existence or the external quality or
conditions of a material object is in issue or is relevant to the
issue, the inspection of the thing itself, produced before the
tribunal, is always proper." 4
It is to be admitted that the proof of injury, which is directed
to the senses, is a most convincing means of proof, and is the best
evidence of a material fact, but it is not the fact that such exhibition is material that comes into dispute when such an exhibition is sought to be admitted, rather it is the claimed prejudicial effect of such exhibition, or the possibility that it might be
indecent that raises the objection to this form of evidence.
Viewing exhibitions of the plaintiff's person from the standpoint that the plaintiff wishes to get it into evidence, as it would
tend to benefit his monetary recovery, such an exhibition often
is sought to be excluded on the basis that: (1) it is not relevant;
(2) that it is unduly prejudicial to the defendant; or (3) that it
is indecent or immoral. The legal encyclopedias 5 and many cases
unquestionably recognize that it is within the discretion of the
trial judge to admit or exclude such proffered exhibition. The
test of the exclusion or admission arises on appeal, when the
overruling of objection to such proffer is sought to be reversed
as error. At this point we must begin to consider upon just
what basis the plaintiff's claim that he may offer the exhibition
is founded.
It has been suggested that to deny a party the right to prove
his case by an exhibition of his injuries is to deny him the right
to prove his case by his clearest evidence. 6 Such thinking perhaps is augmented by those courts which seem to allow the jury
7
to see the injury on the basis that it is a part of the res gestae.
One of the frequent objections to an exhibition of the plaintiff's person is that such exhibition may be indecent.8 But it may
be pointed out that the fact that the exhibition may be indecent
is no real basis for refusing to allow it, for "where justice and
4 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1150 (3rd ed. 1940).
Ibid, Sec. 1151.
5 21 Ohio Jur., Evidence, Sec. 508; 20 Am. Jur. 602, Evidence, Sec. 720; 30
C. J. S.459, Evidence, Sec. 610.
6 4 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1158 (3rd ed. 1940); Dictz v. Aronson, 279
N. Y. S. 66 (1935); Shell Petroleum Co. v. Perrin, 107 Okla. 142, 64 P. 2d
309 (1936).
7 2 Jones, Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, Sec. 358 (4th ed. 1958).
8 Leonard v. Hume, 5 Cal. App. 2d 42, 42 P. 2d 965 (1935); Dunkin v. City
of Hoquiam, 56 Wash. 47, 105 P. 149 (1909); Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. R.
Co. v. Nolan, 161 Ky. 205, 170 S.W. 650 (1914).
3
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the discovery of truth are at stake, the ordinary canons of modesty and delicacy of feelings cannot be allowed to impose prohibitions upon necessary measures." 9 We must also consider
that the crux of this discussion is the desire of a plaintiff to make
such a proffer, which does not take into account the defenses of
privacy or self-incrimination.
Where the question as to the admissibility of exhibitions
which could be considered indecent has arisen, the courts seem
to have been liberal in allowing such exhibitions. No error was
found in a 1909 case in which the plaintiff was allowed to exhibit
an artificial anus.' 0 In an even earlier case, a female was permitted to strip to the waist." It should be noted that in the last
cited case, the female was approximately 14 years old, which
very likely had a bearing upon the admissibility of the exhibition.
However, the bounds of decency would certainly seem to have
been exceeded in a 1927 case in which the jury, although outside
the court room, were permitted an exhibition of a male organ
when the issue of the presence of a scar thereon became a very
12
material fact.
After considering the above noted early cases, it is difficult
to conceive that as late as 1959 a question could arise over the
exhibition of a declivity in the plaintiff's back of about three and
a half inches in diameter and about the depth of a shallow ash3
tray, when it unquestionably was relevant.'
Even though the exhibition may tend to excite sympathy
for the plaintiff,' 4 such exhibition may, while arousing sympathy,
at least clearly indicate to the jury the, extent of the injury,
whereas expert medical testimony may arouse the same or even
a greater degree of sympathy without the jury knowing exactly
what the extent of the plaintiff's injury is. Because the injury,
if exhibited, is vividly real and tangible, the jury may feel that
the defendant is to blame, and that because the plaintiff is in
such bad shape, that he should be compensated, especially in
those cases where the defendant is a corporation. 15 However,
9 4 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1159 (3rd ed. 1940).

10 Dunkin v. City of Hoquiam, 56 Wash. 47, 105 P. 149 (1909).
11 McGuff v. State, 88 Ala. 147, 7 S.35 (1889).
12 Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M. R. Co., 55 N. D. 353, 213 N. W.
841 (1927).
13 Hendricks v. Sanford, 337 P. 2d 974 (Ore., 1959).
14 Landro v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 117 Minn. 306, 135 N. W. 991 (1912).
15 4 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1159 (3rd ed. 1940).
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proper advocacy on the part of defense counsel should eliminate
abuse in this area, as exhibition of the plaintiff's injury is admissible as a means of determining damages, and not for the purpose of imposing or determining liability.
There is a line of decisions indicating that the plaintiff has
an absolute right to exhibit his injuries, and that it is reversible
error to refuse to allow such an exhibition. 16 Such a line of
thinking is obviously not that of the majority of the courts, as
most courts have taken the position that the plaintiff's exhibition
of his personal injuries is discretionary, but always controlled by
the trial judge.
Even more surprising than the recognition of exhibition as a
right of the plaintiff are the cases in which the exhibition involves a physical touching of the plaintiff by the members of
the jury. In an Ohio case, 17 the court permitted the jury to
touch and manipulate the skull of the plaintiff, as the injury,
being a skull depression, was concealed by hair. One would
think that suggesting that the jury touch the injured part would
be cause for greater objection than would be the case in merely
offering to the jury the opportunity to view the injury, as in the
latter case those jurors who might not wish to avail themselves
of such viewing, could discreetly, and without notice, not take
part in the observation.
Other cases have permitted more than mere exhibition of
personal injuries. Courts have allowed an actual examination of
the plaintiff's person by members of the jury as follows: jurors
permitted to examine plaintiff's scars with their fingers;' 8 jurors

felt coldness of plaintiff's hands caused by injury resulting in
abnormal circulation of his blood; 19 plaintiff was permitted to
20
enter the jury box to allow jurors to feel a lump on his arm.
Conclusion
In view of the result of the principal case, it would seem
that mere shocking exhibition would no longer be an objection
to permitting a plaintiff to exhibit to the jury the extent of his
Villagas v. Kercher, 11 Ill. App. 2d 282, 137 N. E. 2d 92 (1956); Stegall v.
Carlson, 61 Ill. App. 433, 128 N. E. 2d 352 (1955).
17 Bluebird Baking Co. v. McCarthy, 19 Ohio L. A. 466, 3 Ohio Op. 490,
36 N. E. 2d 801 (1935).
18 Kubiatowsvi v. Henry Pratt Boiler & Machinery Co., 205 Ill. App. 560
(1917).
19 Sampson v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 156 Mo. App. 419, 138 S. W. 98
(1911).
20 Grubaugh v. Simon J. Murphy Co., 209 Mich. 551, 177 N. W. 217 (1920).
16
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injuries, recognizing, of course, that a question of court room
propriety may cause the exhibition to occur outside the court
room. Earlier cases, and even those prior to 1900, indicate that
matters of delicacy, and even those that might be thought to be
indecent exhibitions, may be properly handled by the court without being objectionable. Both the matters of arousing the sympathy of the jury, and going beyond the area of decency have
come before the courts, with the result that a way has been
found to get into evidence exhibitions that would, at first blush,
appear to be of questionable admissibility. The primary rule
developed is that the exhibition be necessary to a relevant issue
in the plaintiff's case. Beyond this point, and without question,
it becomes the duty of the trial judge to allow the exhibition
unless his sound discretion indicates the contrary. At present,
it would appear that a trial judge can allow any exhibition, either
in the court room, or if such exhibition would disturb the
decorum thereof, in some other place where the jury may
privately avail themselves of the exhibition. The discretion
would appear to be very broad, and reversible error difficult to
prove.
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